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Abstract
Background: In 2009, New York reformed its “Rockefeller Drug Laws”, terminating mandatory imprisonment for
many drug charges and expanding the availability of treatment alternatives to incarceration. The reforms occurred
in an environment characterized by high incarceration rates, racial/ethnic disparities in drug convictions and
incarceration rates, and expanded use of alternatives to incarceration. Early administrative data show a large impact
on the criminal justice system. Few studies have considered the reforms from the providers’ perspective and none
have sought to understand how providers are experiencing the reforms in their everyday practice.
Methods: To provide a providers’ perspective, we use a qualitative, case-study approach entailing in-depth interviews
with drug treatment program leaders and staff in six of the leading New York City drug programs, all with extensive
experience treating court-mandated clients. Our goal was to assess treatment providers’ experiences during the reforms’
first years in effect.
Results: The providers’ reports indicate that no new administrative structures or processes have been developed to foster
a changed relationship between the treatment system and the criminal justice system; that the reforms failed to establish
an enhanced role for treatment providers in the courts; and that client assessment, decisions on choice of treatment
modalities, and program length for mandated clients continue to be dominated by criminal justice rather than clinical
concerns. The providers also report some improvements in their communications and relationships with court employees
involved in court-mandated cases.
Conclusion: Despite some positive changes, implementation issues are potentially limiting the reforms’ ability to
capitalize fully on the potential cost-savings and improvements in public health and safety that can result from the
appropriate use of drug treatment as an alternative to incarceration. What appears to be occurring alongside the evolving
shift from punishment to treatment under the terms of the reforms is a growing demand for treatment providers to meet
the requirements of the powerful criminal justice system.
Keywords: Rockefeller drug laws; Drug policy; Drug law reform; Treatment alternatives to incarceration

Introduction
In an era in which state budgets across the United States
have been strained by high incarceration rates, policy
makers have grown increasingly receptive to the utilization
of substance abuse treatment as an alternative to incarceration (ATI) for drug-using individuals charged with certain
drug offenses. From the creation and expansion of drug
treatment courts to changes in sentencing structures, the
* Correspondence: rdr300@nyu.edu
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national trend has been arcing toward a wider availability of
options in the disposition of cases involving non-violent,
drug-related crimes. These changes have followed years of
research showing the effectiveness of treatment and much
advocacy work aimed at shifting drug policy from a punitive model to a medical or public health model.
Perhaps no state policy change has more starkly evidenced an official move away from punishment and toward treatment than recent reforms to New York State’s
“Rockefeller Drug Laws”. When Governor David Patterson
signed the Drug Law Reform Act of 2009 (DLRA) into
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law, New York ended one of the most rigid and punitive
drug policies in the nation and entered an era that, at least
on paper, recognized that treating drug offenders represented a better and more cost-effective way to increase
public safety. Passing the DLRA constituted an important
step toward treating rather than punishing non-violent
drug offenders. In NYS, the imprisonment of drug offenders has declined 37% since the 2009 legislative reforms came into effect (DCJS 2011). But the legislation’s
ultimate outcomes, in such areas as the long-term effects
of averting prison sentences and the success of drug treatment programs in breaking the cycle of drug use and drug
offending, will largely depend upon how its changes have
been implemented and how they are being carried out in
practice.
Three years after the DLRA’s passage, it is clear that the
impact on the criminal justice system has been dramatic;
however, very little is apparent about how the reforms and
their implementation have affected the substance abuse
treatment system at the operational level. How are treatment providers experiencing the reforms in practice?
What is their view of procedural changes related to diverting eligible defendants into treatment under the reforms?
How do they see operational matters in terms of the reforms’ explicit attempt to shift from punishment to treatment? What does the new relationship between criminal
justice system employees and substance abuse treatment
system employees look like in the post-reform period from
providers’ vantage point? Few studies have looked at drug
law reform from the perspective of treatment providers,
and none have specifically attempted to understand how
they have experienced its implementation at the level of
daily operations.
This paper provides a qualitative portrait of the DLRA’s
implementation from the perspective of substance abuse
treatment providers in New York City (NYC). It is based
on research made possible by a Fellowship jointly administered by John Jay College of Criminal Justice and the
Vera Institute of Justicea. The data are drawn from consultation and interviews with several experts familiar with
treatment, case management, and drug law reform issues
in NYC and from in-depth, semi-structured interviews
with ten individuals employed by NYC-based treatment
provider organizations that are established parts of the
city’s ATI apparatus. It is important to emphasize that our
data are not derived from a systematic random probability
sample of the population of treatment providers in NYS
and that the research neither aims at nor claims to provide
findings that are statistically generalizable to that population. Our goal with this research was not to understand
the distribution of NYS providers across pre-chosen categories. Instead, we endeavored to uncover the categories
that are relevant to treatment providers in their experience of the implementation of drug law reforms in NYC.
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Understanding these categories offers insight into the reforms’ implementation from the providers’ perspective
and offers information with which to generate new hypotheses and stimulate further researchb.

Background
New York State’s “Rockefeller Drug Laws”, passed in
1973, were the first state laws to mandate lengthy prison
sentences for many drug offenders. This approach to
sentencing drug offenders spread to many other states
and Federal jurisdictions in subsequent years (Maggio
2006). In NYS, the proportion of the incarcerated population held on drug charges rose dramatically under
these laws—from 11 percent of new commitments in
1980 to 47 percent in 1990 (DCJS 2010), and the trend
throughout this period was similar nationwide.
Rising incarceration rates

Between 1970 and 2007, the nation’s incarcerated population grew tenfold—to over two million in state and
Federal facilities (Petteruti and Zeidenberg 2007)—making the United States’ incarceration rates higher than
any in the world (Walmsley 2009; Warren 2008). While
there are many factors contributing to this growth, research suggests that it is largely the product of rising
commitments for drug offenses combined with the increasing use of mandatory minimum sentencing, as well
as the role of predicate offenses in lengthening sentences
for drug charges (Drucker 2002, 2011; Harrison 2001;
Rengifo and Wilson 2005). Of the growing number of
individuals incarcerated for drug offenses nationally, 58
percent are non-violent and have no history of high-level
drug charges (King and Mauer 2002).
Racial and ethnic disparities

The increase in the use of incarceration as a response to
drug offending has had a disproportionate impact on
communities of color. Despite findings that rates of drug
use are only slightly higher for African Americans (10.7
percent) than rates of use for whites (9.1 percent)
(SAMHSA 2003), 27 percent of the increase in the African
American prison population between 1990 and 2000 was
attributable to drug offenses, as compared to 14 percent
of the increase in the white prison population during that
same time period (Beck and Harrison 2001). The racial
and ethnic disparity in incarceration for drug offenses is
particularly striking in NYS, where in 2001 the ratio of
African American males to white males ages 21-44 incarcerated for drug offenses was greater than forty to one
(Beck and Harrison 2001).
In the face of these rising levels of incarceration and
the disparities involved, public support grew for reform
of sentencing policies for persons convicted of drug offenses. A 2002 national opinion survey found that over
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70 percent of Americans supported mandated drug treatment and community service sentences over incarceration
for persons convicted of possession and low-level distribution charges (Hart Research Associates 2002).
Alternatives to incarceration (ATIs)

ATIs for drug offenders are held out as one way to reduce imprisonment without compromising public safety,
and over the last 20 years, there has been an explosion
in the availability of treatment-based ATIs. One widely
used ATI mechanism has been drug courts. Drug courts
typically divert people facing non-violent charges from
prison and jail into treatment, providing direct court
supervision, coordinating treatment services, and expediting case processing. There are approximately 2,600 drug
courts currently operating in the US (NIJ 2012), with 147
of these in NYS (NYS UCS 2014).
Another important method for diverting substance
abusers into treatment involves sentencing options available to judges and diversion by prosecutors, for cases that
are not handled by specialized drug courts. These may
take the form of a sentence of substance abuse treatment
as a condition of probation or as an intermediate “punishment” with no probation component attached (Warner
and Kramer 2009). In a number of jurisdictions, including
several in NYS, prosecutors have the option of offering
treatment based alternatives as part of a plea-bargain
agreement.
Treatment and supervision

Studies have shown that community-based treatment of
offenders is effective if programs are carefully designed and
properly implemented (Mitchell et al. 2012; Rossman et al.
2011; Belenko 2001; Belenko et al. 2005; NIDA 2007;
Pearson and Lipton 1999). Offenders who participate in
community-based treatment either through drug courts,
as a condition of probation or parole, or as part of a sentence imposed by a judge are subject to the demands of
both the criminal justice system and the drug treatment
system—two systems that do not always align in terms
of their goals and methods. Indeed, there exists an inherent tension between the criminal justice model and
the clinical model in managing individuals in treatment:
criminal justice actors are typically more focused on
monitoring compliance with treatment goals and imposing sanctions for defendants’ failures to do so; and
clinicians see these “failures” as normal parts of the
treatment process and assert the need for modifications
of individualized treatment plans.
Marlowe (2003) points out that “public health proponents and public safety proponents may have different
types of drug-involved offenders in mind” when they advocate for their preferred model, and he distinguishes between “low-risk” and “high-risk” offenders, arguing that
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finding the correct level of criminal justice intervention
for individuals in treatment should follow from an assessment of those individuals’ risk status and their response to
treatment (p. 13). He concludes, “Programs that jointly
allocate responsibility for clients to criminal justice and
drug abuse treatment professionals are in the best position
to respond readily by increasing or decreasing their
coordination of efforts, depending upon clients’ performance in the program” (p. 13, emphasis added).
In terms of joint responsibility and coordination between criminal justice and treatment, Wenzel et al. (2001)
point to the potential of drug courts. They call the drug
court, in its ideal form, a “bridge” between the criminal
justice system and the public health system due to the
collaborative links it potentially engenders between the
courts, treatment providers, community-based organizations, and other social service agencies. Wenzel and
colleagues studied 14 drug courts in the US and found
that in nearly every case the relationships between the
courts and service providers were informal and lacked
systemization, with problems of information sharing and
documentation evident. They note that in practice “there
may be a tension between the supervisory and rehabilitation objectives of drug courts that may interfere with
building bridges and access to services” (p. 250).
Research suggests that ATIs that include a high level
of criminal justice supervision without a robust treatment component are ineffective in managing drug-using
individuals. Petersilia and Turner (1990) studied Intensive Probation Supervision (IPS) programs in California
and found that participants under intensive supervision
had significantly higher rates of technical violations than
those under regular supervision and that there was no
significant difference in arrest rates between the two
groups. They argue that “the issue of adequate drug
treatment and monitoring cannot be ignored” considering that more than half of participants were in need of
treatment and few received it (p. 109). Moreover, they
found that significant percentages of technical violations
and new arrests involved drugs. In a later study of IPSs,
the authors conclude that more intensive supervision
without effective substance abuse treatment had no significant impact on drug-using offenders’ subsequent
criminal behavior (Petersilia and Turner 1993).
All of these factors—the relationship between commitments on drug offenses and rising rates of incarceration,
the largely non-violent profile of persons arrested on
drug charges, the striking racial and ethnic disparities in
drug arrest and incarceration (despite minimal racial
and ethnic differences in drug use), and increased public
support for ATIs for this population—have contributed
to recent moves toward reforming states’ drug laws as a
potential method to reduce incarceration costs without
threatening public safety.
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NYS 2009 drug law reform

Much as the “Rockefeller drug laws” provided a model
for establishment of the national use of long mandatory
sentences for drug offenses, the recent DLRA may offer
an example and road map for other jurisdictions considering similar changes. After several earlier amendments to
the original laws in 2002 and 2005, the NYS Legislature
instituted the most significant changes to date in April
2009, when mandatory prison sentences for some drug offenses were eliminated and minimum sentence lengths
were reduced for others. Table 1 provides details of the
DLRA’s sentencing changes.
In October 2009, Article 216 of the Penal Law became
effective, expanding judicial discretion to offer drug court
alternatives to certain addicted non-violent offenders.
Article 216 gives judges the power to divert eligible defendants into treatment, even over the objection of the prosecutor. This change is particularly significant in New York
City, where longstanding District Attorney led diversion
programs have historically been the primary vehicles for diverting cases to treatment. In response to the passage of
the DLRA, the NYS Unified Court System (UCS) engaged
in “an almost year-long process to plan for and implement
a case processing system that would fulfill the intent of the
legislation” (NYS UCS 2009, p. 1). One key change made
by the UCS during this process was the creation of Judicial
Diversion Parts (JDPs) in many Judicial Districts across the
state, and at least one JDP in all of the five counties of
New York City (Edwards 2011).
These JDPs are responsible for judicially diverting eligible defendants away from incarceration and into treatment in compliance with the DLRA. Article 216 cases
constitute an entirely new category of defendant/client,
and the judicial diversion program constitutes an entirely
new process for offering treatment as an ATI. The judicial
diversion of Article 216-eligible defendants is thus one of
the most relevant parts of the DLRA in terms of assessing
its implementation from the treatment perspective.
The increased use of community-based drug treatment
was explicit in the state’s DLRA planning, with $71 million
being allocated through the NYS Office of Alcoholism and

Substance Abuse Services (OASAS) for new treatment initiatives. However, more than half of these funds had yet to
be disbursed as of September 30, 2011, and thus, some of
the programs originally called for remained underfunded or
unfunded, including hiring more designated court-based
screeners, expanding outpatient treatment services,
and increasing case-management services in the courts
(CCG 2012).
DLRA: early findings

Early findings from the NYS Division of Criminal Justice
Services (DCJS 2011) show that both the number of
people screened to determine their eligibility to participate in drug court and the actual number of drug court
admissions of DLRA-eligible cases have increased statewide. However, much of the increase in screenings is attributable to the counties outside of NYC. While screenings in
NYC increased by only 5 percent from 2008 to 2010, they
almost tripled in the rest of the state. Admissions increases
were also higher in the rest of the state than in NYC, with
NYC admissions doubling and the rest of the state’s
admissions almost tripling. This disparity is likely due
to the fact that the NYC counties already had robust
prosecutor-led diversion programs in place prior to
the reforms. Thus, it is not necessarily surprising that
NYC experienced a smaller rate increase than other
areas.
While agencies are monitoring the implementation of
the reforms using administrative data, mostly capturing
criminal justice impacts, a very limited number of studies have sought to understand the DLRA and its implementation from the perspective of substance abuse
treatment providers involved in the handling of judicially
diverted cases. One survey of 28 providers was conducted
in 2009 by Fluellen, Gray, and Primm just two months after
the last phase of the reforms went into effect. The study
gathered data on providers’ views on their relationships
with members of community programs and the criminal
justice system and on their perception of whether they
would be able to handle the increased client load, which
nearly all assumed would occur as a result of the reforms.

Table 1 Summary of DLRA sentencing changes
Drug conviction charge level
B Felony
Pre-DLRA
1-9 yrs prison; OR
Sentence options SHOCK1

B Felony
predicate*

C Felony
predicate*

D Felony
predicate*

E Felony
predicate*

3 ½ - 12 yrs prison

2-8 yrs prison; OR
SHOCK1

1 ½ - 4 yrs prison; OR
SHOCK1; OR Willard2

1 ½ - 2 yrs prison;
OR SHOCK1; OR Willard2

1½ - 8 yrs; OR jail term ≤
1 yr; OR probation; OR
judicial diversion; OR
Willard2; OR SHOCK1

1½ - 4 yrs prison; OR jail
term ≤ 1 yr; OR probation;
OR judicial diversion;
OR SHOCK1; OR Willard2

1½ - 2 yrs prison; OR jail
term ≤ 1 yr; OR probation;
OR judicial diversion;
OR SHOCK1; OR Willard2

1-9 yrs prison; OR jail
Post-DLRA
2 - 12 yrs prison;
Sentence options term ≤ 1 yr; OR probation; OR judicial diversion;
(changes in bold) OR judicial diversion;
OR SHOCK1
OR Willard2; OR SHOCK1

*With a prior non-violent offense.
1
SHOCK is a 6-month boot camp program; post-reforms, SHOCK can be court ordered.
2
Willard is a 90-day intensive treatment program; participants are under parole supervision.
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Providers overwhelmingly indicated that their relationships with their criminal justice partners were less than
ideal, with 82 percent calling the relationships either “not
adequate” or “somewhat adequate;” almost all believed
that the reforms inherently required a realignment of the
criminal justice-treatment provider relationships (96 percent) and an expansion of relationships with other community stakeholders (93 percent). In terms of capacity to
handle an influx of new criminal justice-mandated patients, 72 percent of those surveyed indicated that their
agencies currently had the ability to handle this increase.
A 2012 study, carried out by the New York State Senate
Standing Committee on Alcoholism & Drug Abuse and the
Association for Substance Abuse Providers, surveyed 156
participants from provider organizations across NYS.
Among other findings, the survey found that 47 percent
of respondents had seen an increase in referrals from
criminal justice entities since the reforms, while 46 percent had seen no change and 7 percent have seen a
decrease. Nearly all (97 percent) of those who saw an
increase in criminal justice cases reported that their organizations had not seen a concomitant increase in funding.
As states begin to follow in New York’s footsteps, crafting new sentencing rules for drug offenses, there is a need
to understand the issues that have arisen for New York in
the implementation of the DLRA. In this effort, the views
of treatment providers are crucial. The surveys described
above have increased knowledge of providers’ views on
the reforms and provided valuable information. This paper
expands on the currently available survey data by providing the first in-depth account of NYC providers’ in situ experiences of treating criminal justice-mandated clients in
the wake of the DLRA’s implementation.

Methods
As noted above, the goal of this research was not to know
the distribution of the population of NYS treatment providers across a range of categories chosen in advance. Rather, we sought to discover how treatment providers are
experiencing the reforms at the level of everyday practice.
Our aim was thus systematically to investigate which categories are important to providers and impact them the
most. A random probability sample and survey can help
us estimate parameters when we know what to ask. Given
that the DLRA represents a watershed in drug policy in
the state, and potentially in the nation, and that no studies
have sought to understand its implementation from the
provider perspective, a valuable first step is to discover the
relevant categories of interest, exactly what we attempt to
do here. Qualitative research is particularly suited to this
task of achieving emergent knowledge. Even a careful
“single-case study can justifiably state that a particular
process, phenomenon, mechanism, tendency, type, relationship, dynamic, or practice exists” (Small 2009, p. 24;
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cf. also Glaser and Strauss 1967; Lofland and Lofland
1995; Lamont and White 2009).
Our methodological approach to this research is to
adopt Small’s (2009) application of case study logic to indepth interview-based studies, “such that the latter may
be conceived as not small-sample studies but multiplecase studies” (p. 24; cf. also Yin 2002). Whereas the goal of
survey research based on random samples is statistical
representativeness, the goal of multiple-case studies is
quite different: “In a case model…the collection of units
is, by design, not representative; each unit has its own
probability of selection; and different units are subject to
different questionnaires…. If the study is conducted properly, the very last case examined will provide very little
new or surprising information. The objective is saturation”
(Small 2009, pgs. 24-25). This methodology enables us to
generate findings that are representative not of a population but rather of a phenomenon (Luker 2008). In other
words, by systematically applying case study logic and
modifying the focus of our interview as we proceeded
through our cases, we assert that we were able to uncover
general aspects of how providers are experiencing the reforms’ implementation. How the population of NYS providers is distributed across these categories is a question
for future research.
The data we present here are based on a set of cases
comprising consultations and interviews with treatment
experts and in-depth, semi-structured interviews with ten
individuals employed by six different substance abuse
treatment provider organizations in New York City. The
in-depth interviews took place over the course of approximately two months, from December 6, 2011 to
January 30, 2012. Each interview lasted between fortyfive and seventy-five minutes. Four of the interviews
were with single respondents; three were with two respondents together. All consultations and interviews
were recorded with respondents’ consent and later transcribed in whole or in part.
Case selection

We began this research by reviewing legislation, literature, reports, and other data related to New York State’s
drug laws and their relationship to substance abuse
treatment. The aim of this part of the formative research
was to gain a broad understanding of the background
and current context of drug law reform and substance
abuse treatment in New York. This was an important
first step in developing the categories around which our
interview instrument would be based. We expanded our
knowledge of the field and refined our categories by consulting with three experts in substance abuse treatment,
court case management, and substance abuse treatment
research. With these experts, we also discussed methods
for reaching out to substance abuse treatment providers.
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The recruitment strategy involved emailing key actors at
substance abuse treatment providers to inquire about their
willingness to participate in research designed to explain
how the implementation of the 2009 drug law reforms
looked from their perspective. Contact information of potential respondents was gathered both from the treatment
experts and from a search of New York State’s Office of
Alcoholism and Substance Abuse Services (OASAS) database of state-certified providers in New York City. The researcher sent emails to forty-one individuals working at
substance abuse treatment providers in the city and
followed up with phone calls to all of the organizations for
which phone numbers were current.
These efforts generated responses from and conversations with four individuals. Additionally, one of the treatment experts agreed to send a recruitment email prepared
by the researcher to a listserv of NYC providers who were
members of a statewide provider organization. The extent
of the overlap between this list and the OASAS list used
by the researcher is unknown. From the bulk email sent
out to the expert’s listserv, two additional responses were
generated. Altogether, the responses from both of these efforts ultimately led to interviews with ten respondents.
The respondents from the six treatment organizations
held various positions including therapist, program director, executive director, senior director, criminal justice
specialist, and admissions director. Although there appears to be a high level of role disparity among these respondents, all of them had extensive experience in the
field of substance abuse treatment, all had on-the-ground
practical experience with handling court-mandated clients, and all had been working in the field before, during,
and after the implementation of the DLRA. Moreover,
some of this seeming disparity is an artifact of position
naming conventions at various organizations. For example, titles like “program director”, “senior director”, and
“criminal justice specialist” indicate positions with similar
responsibilities at different agencies. The organizations at
which respondents worked were certified by OASAS and
were among the largest and most established components
of the NYC ATI apparatus. The organizations were located
in the New York City boroughs of Manhattan, Brooklyn,
and Bronx. Two of them offered solely outpatient services.
The other four provided both residential and outpatient
servicesc.
Building and refining the interview instrument

The interview instrument was semi-structured to 1) allow
the researcher to focus on the specific categories identified
during the literature and document review and refined
through our first three cases of consultation with treatment experts and 2) enable respondents to expand the
discussion and focus on issues important to them. The
original seven categories included the following:

Page 6 of 14

 The process of judicial diversion
 Screening, assessment, and treatment design in






diversion cases
Resource issues related to the reforms
Communication with criminal justice partners
The relationship between treatment and supervision
Referred-client suitability
Overall perspective on the reforms and their
implementation

Although the instrument retained this general sevenpart structure throughout the data-collection period of
the study, we modified questions slightly as data collection proceeded and began to shift our focus onto three
categories that emerged as most relevant for the providers. These categories included issues related to the
process of receiving clients judicially diverted into treatment, the assessment and treatment of criminal justice
mandated clients, and the relationship dynamics involved in collaborating with court employees in the
post-reform era. It became clear that these three categories were the most relevant aspects of the reforms’
implementation from providers’ perspective. By the last
few interviews, providers were virtually repeating what
others had already told us about these three areas of
concern, indicating that we had reached saturation on
these issues.

Results
Our research identified three key categories that represent
important aspects of how treatment providers in NYC are
experiencing the implementation of the DLRA. First, our
interviews suggest that the reforms generated little change
in the process by which criminal justice clients are processed through the courts and into treatment. This finding
is especially surprising in light of the reforms explicit creation of an entirely new mechanism of judicial diversion
under Article 216 of the law. Second, respondents systematically indicated that important aspects related to assessment and treatment of mandated clients continue to be
dominated by criminal justice rather than clinical concerns, potentially limiting the reforms’ potential to shift
NY drug policy from a punishment model to a treatment
model. Third, despite these problems, many respondents
reported improved relationships with their criminal
justice partners since the passage of the reforms. Together, the three areas of process, assessment and
treatment, and relationships encompass the main postreform issues for the NYC treatment providers we
interviewed.
Process

Although Article 216 of the DLRA created an entirely
new category of court-mandated client and a completely
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new court process for diverting clients into treatment,
these changes occurred largely without input from and
with little apparent effect on treatment providers. Significantly, many of the providers interviewed for the
study were unfamiliar with the term “Article 216 cases”,
a term which is routinely used by judges and other
court-personnel to refer to cases that are handled using
the new DLRA diversion mechanismsd. Providers’ unfamiliarity with this term is important because it demonstrates a continued disconnect between the courts and
treatment providers and suggests a business-as-usual
paradigm that is out of line with the reforms’ potential
to facilitate a new spirit of collaboration between these
two systems. In most instances, providers made no distinction between Article 216 diversions and other criminal justice-mandated clients, such as those coming from
drug courts, parole, or probation. At the level of daily
operations in provider organizations, it was as if this important part of the reforms never happened.
A program director at a large, multi-site organization
that offered both residential and out-patient services,
reported, “No, [I don’t know the term Article 216 case].
I know about what I see from the clients themselves
who have been judicially diverted to treatment and
they’re given a choice between jail/prison or treatment,
whether that comes from TASCe or Brooklyn Drug Court
or [somewhere else]”.
A Senior Director who had extensive experience in
treating criminal justice-mandated clients at an established organization reported that he did not know the
term and after an explanation went on to note:
Well, we normally get referrals. Those clients either
wind up on probation—they get referred to us [by
probation], or they come from like DTAPf. So they
pretty much come… from criminal justice agencies and
then they come to us. I mean, we may have a walk-in,
but for the most part they come from a referral source
and then they come directly to us…. We get clients
from drug treatment courts. We get clients from the
DA’s office. So we predominately get these referrals
from the judicial system.
A therapist who worked at an outpatient facility that
specializes in medical therapy was similarly unfamiliar
with the term: “No…I’m at sea with this…What is an Article 216?” After an explanation, he went on to note, “Well,
we know what court [i.e. Manhattan Treatment Court,
Brooklyn Treatment Court, etc.] because we are in contact
with the case managers in the individual courts to chart
the progress of the patient, but I don’t know if it’s an Article 216 or some other type of diversion”.
Among the respondents who were familiar with the
term were those involved with policy work or who spent
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significant amounts of time either in the courts or communicating with the courts; however, even they were typically unable to distinguish between Article 216 diversions
and other mandated clients at the level of daily operations.
For example, a provider who was a Vice President and
Director of Admissions noted the following:
You know, the diversion, the drug law reform when it
first came about, it was a situation that not a lot of
people had a lot of information about and it went on
like that for awhile and we were getting referrals that
started to trickle in at one point and even then we
weren’t sure, I mean is this a diversion client? There
were a lot of definitions that needed to be made and a
lot of categories that needed to be made, and I think
that because of that…there’s never been like a smooth
transition. There’s never been like a juncture where
people could say, ok, this is where the diversion clients
are coming in…. It still, to this day, is sort of a murky,
um, issue… We know we’re getting them. We know
we’re reaching out to them, but there still isn’t…like an
actual system or track in place that we can clearly say,
ok these are strictly diversions.
The general inability of providers to identify Article 216
diversions partly indicates a limited use of Article 216
hearings and diversions in NYC, but it also suggests that
while the DLRA generated changes in the courts aimed at
identifying, screening, and processing Article 216 cases,
these changes were limited to the court side of the judicial
diversion process and remained largely invisible to treatment providers.
We found that the reforms have brought about little, if
any, enhancement of the direct interface between the
courts and treatment providers. It appears that no administrative structures or processes have been created
for facilitating a new relationship between the treatment
system and the criminal justice system or for establishing a larger role for treatment providers in the courts. It
is true, as noted above, that new judicial diversion parts
have been set up in a number of courts, that the courts
have employed screeners to work in these parts, and that
there is a new monitoring system in place to assess the
impact of the DLRA; however, these changes all occurred in the courts. From the view of providers, then,
an Article 216 diversion procedurally looks like any
other criminal justice-mandated client, and criminal
justice-mandated clients all look about the same today
as they did before the reforms were passed.
Part of the reason for this may be explained by a comment made by one of the treatment experts interviewed
during formative research. He noted that the reform legislation had originally included some budgetary language
calling for the creation of a treatment-run program in
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every NY county that would be a uniform, statewide system to “direct traffic” between the courts and the substance abuse treatment system. This would have been a
new infrastructure and would have provided an official
role for treatment in the courts; however, the program
was cut in the implementation phase, according to the expert. He noted that, as a result, “there was no one directing traffic, no change in the system. The people who were
already doing things a certain way just kept doing what
they were doing the same way”.
The Senior Director of Centralized Services at a multisite provider organization explained that the failure to
create a new and effective infrastructure might have
been avoided if provider input had been sought in the
planning phase of the implementation process: “Or even
in the conceptualization of this. You know, what would
be the challenges? What would be the points of intersection? What were the potential areas of breakdown as we
start this whole new system of communication? That did
not happen at the beginning and somehow got dropped
out of the process…. Was it supposed to be part of the
process?.... I don’t know, but if I had designed a process,
it would’ve been”.
The fact that so many of the providers interviewed
were unable to identify Article 216 cases among their
client population is significant as it suggests a businessas-usual paradigm in the courts that contrasts with the
goal of the reforms to engender a new spirit of communication and collaboration between the criminal justice
system and the treatment system. The creation of a new
category of client and a new process of judicial diversion
should have made an impact on the treatment system.
The fact that it appears not to have done so indicates
that this important part of the reforms has been implemented in a way that excludes a role for providers.
Assessment and treatment

Considering that the reforms sought to move New York
State away from a punitive model and toward a treatment
model in managing non-violent, drug-using offenders, the
expectation would be that assessing and treating criminal
justice defendants/clients would be governed more by
clinical concerns than by criminal justice concerns in the
post-reform period. It appears that some progress in this
area has been made (see the Relationships section below);
however, many providers interviewed expressed concern
that the assessments conducted by the various screening
and referring agencies in the courts are often not clinically
oriented and that decisions about treatment modalities
and length often seemed to be determined by criminal
justice rather than clinical concerns. Many respondents
noted the need for more clinicians in the initial phase
of the screening and assessment process carried out in
the courts.
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When asked how treatment length was determined in
cases involving criminal justice-mandated clients, a Director of Centralized Admissions at one large agency explained, “How long it’s gonna be comes from the criminal
justice system… That’s a criminal justice decision. No, it’s
not clinical at all; Not so good…because, especially if, what
they’re requesting, after our assessment, we feel should be
different, we’d like to have that conversation with them to
discuss, you know”.
A Criminal Justice Specialist at a large and well-respected
Manhattan provider discussed how, in some cases, his
organization had to defer to criminal justice and referring
entities on when to end the treatment of a mandated client:
“We cannot release a DTAP person, even if we feel they’ve
completed, until DTAP says we can let them go…until
TASC says. They oversee”.
Similarly, a staff member at a multi-site organization
mentioned that she had “heard of clients staying in CRs
[community residences] for like a long, long time because they haven’t gotten their GED. They can’t finish
their mandated requirements because this person can’t
get their GED”.
Along these same lines, another treatment supervisor
mentioned the lack of a clinical perspective in the initial
phase of the screening and assessment process carried out
in the courts and discussed the tension this created between the court’s treatment plan and his own agency’s plan:
I think mainly their assessment likely has a lot to do
with offense levels…. What ends up happening is that
they’re sent to us… We have a plan, but there’s also a
plan at the drug court level. And the plan at the drug
court level has a lot to do with sobriety. How long can
this person remain sober? A lot of their plan is based
on adherence to sobriety, in other words, passing
urine tests. Where our plan is based on individual
psychotherapy, group psychotherapy that includes a
lot of education, relapse prevention, education about
alcohol abuse, the neurobiological impact…. I think
part of the problem is that these people [in the
courts] are legal entities [rather than clinical entities].
There is an important link of this issue to the fiscal interests of the providers. Considering that the treatment
organizations depend upon the court and its referring
agencies for clients, which frequently constitute a significant part (and in some cases the majority) of their programs’ income, there exists a powerful incentive in the
current system for providers to “go along” with decisions
affecting clinical care that are made by the criminal justice
entities. As a Program Director reported,
Treatment agencies in general do whatever a judge
says, right? You know where your bread is buttered.
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So when the judge says, ‘He will go to 2 years of
residential,’ and we say, ‘He’s really only appropriate
for outpatient,’ we don’t argue. We sign that person
up for two years of residential and they’re stuck there.
It’s used as an option for incarceration.
But doing “whatever a judge says” does not necessarily
imply any direct communication between providers and
judges (or any official) in the current system. Instead,
these communications are typically mediated by courtemployed referral and case-management agents.
When asked what they would recommend to improve
the type of issues discussed above, providers argued that
there should be a larger role for treatment considerations in the process of deciding which cases to divert
and more clinician involvement in the initial screening
and assessment phases in the courts. One director of an
outpatient program explained, “I would love to see more
social workers in this process, in the courtroom, from
the beginning of this process, because social workers
have a big influence on the judge…on decisions that they
make. So I would like to see more social workers in that
arena when it begins”.
A Criminal Justice Specialist at a large provider agreed:
“I think, if I was to be able to have a voice in it, that they
should have more clinical people there making assessments instead of the criminal people in the courts. If
you’re saying you want to work with the treatment part
of this thing, instead of the criminal…[then there should
be more clinical people in the courts]”.
Another treatment provider also felt that there was a specific need for treatment professionals to play more of a role
in the early part of the assessment and screening process:
Well, I think that…some of them have them; they
have what’s called a CASAC. A CASAC is a Certified
Alcohol and Substance Abuse Counselor. And if on
the front end, they had somebody screening them,
before they get referred, then they’d be better at
sorting out people’s appropriateness for different
levels of treatment instead of just, ok, everybody’s
going to residential. A clinician should be part of this
whole process. Not everybody does that. It should be
part of the process because then they’re able to do a
quick assessment based upon, not just your arrest but
personal history. But what happens is most judicial
system [people] want to refer to residential because
of the thing of custody… While it’s not a jail, but a
custody thing, so they’ll refer [to residential]. In
outpatient, you come and go. So it becomes more
custodial a lot of times. Well, it would help with
making sure this person goes to the appropriate
level. I mean, I wouldn’t go to a podiatrist if I had
chest pain.
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A new infrastructure that included a role for treatment
in key decision-making would have possibly helped to
improve some of these problems with assessment and
treatment. At the very least, such a new system would
have put treatment providers in closer and earlier contact with actors in the criminal justice system, with the
explicit goals of fostering better communication and
building relationships.
Interestingly, in the absence of a systematized, uniform
interface between the courts and treatment, with an official
role for treatment in the courts, nearly all providers interviewed discussed using “Criminal Justice Liaisons”. These
are provider employees responsible for spending time in
the courts to advocate for defendants to be placed into their
programs and for building relationships with court employees who refer and case-manage criminal justice clients.
Some providers reported having these positions in place before the reforms, but others noted that they had created
such positions after the passage of the reforms. For example, a senior director at an outpatient facility noted,
I think we adapted by creating the CJ [criminal
justice] liaisons. You know…it was created as a result
of the reforms. We saw that we would get referrals
from a specific division of parole or a specific drug
court but not all of them so we created this to make
sure that it wasn’t out of sight out of mind. So now
that I have somebody whose job it is 5 days a week to
go in and out of every court in every borough we have
a greater exposure and a greater presence and as a
result of that, greater communication.
In other words, instead of an official, formalized system to facilitate communication and collaboration between treatment and criminal justice, individual provider
agencies have created informal mechanisms to build
these relationships at their own expense. However, these
liaison positions still do not address providers’ concerns
over the lack of clinician involvement in the assessment
and screening process, since these employees are typically not social workers or CASACs and are not at all involved in assessment and screening.
Relationships

Although many providers expressed concern over what
they perceive as a disconnect between treatment and criminal justice—especially in areas such as initial assessment
and decisions about treatment length and treatment
modality— several reported that their relationships with
their criminal justice partners seem to have improved in
the years since the reforms. While not all providers
expressed universal satisfaction with every aspect of
these relationships, many discussed how they are now
able to collaborate effectively with their criminal justice
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partners in treating mandated clients, a situation that
was new to many if not to all providers.
When asked whether they perceived any tension between treatment and supervision in treating clients mandated by criminal justice, for example, some providers
noted that this had never been an issue. One explained, “I
couldn’t say that that’s been a problem. I think that if
someone is noncompliant or is testing positive and we notify the court, that’s a collaborative effort to move to the
next step”. Similarly, another flatly stated, “No”, without
elaborating.
Other providers, by contrast, had not always experienced smooth relationships with their criminal justice
partners and discussed how tension between treatment
and supervision had lessened since the passage of the reforms. One explained, “Not now. In the past… But in
this last year, they’re not like that anymore. They really
understand. Now, you know, we go to them and we say
this happened and that happened; we give a recommendation, and they kind of go along with it”.
Another provider also agreed that matters had gotten
better: “My understanding is that the courts really are
working towards the abstinence model. It’s not harm reduction. It’s the abstinence model and [they] have grown
a little more tolerant over the years, which is helpful to
us treatment people because, you know, we understand
that relapse, one relapse, doesn’t necessarily mean the
person needs to go back to jail or prison. And so I’m
happy to see that. I think some of our clients would like
to see a harm reduction model, but that’s not in the
cards right now”.
Even those providers who felt a great degree of tension
in their relationships with their criminal justice partners
discussed how successful collaboration is sometimes
achieved. A senior program officer’s comments are a case
in point:
There’s a ton. I mean, the example that I heard most
recently that I’m just furious about is, we’ve got a guy at
[one of our facilities] who is 9 credits short of his
Associate’s degree… He’s doing wonderfully.
[A representative of the New York City courts] won’t
let him go to school; they want him to get a job or go to
voc training… The fact that they’re restricting that kind
of access to education is infuriating. So yeah, there’s
some tension…. [But] It depends on the facility. And it
depends who the mandator is. So sometimes what
happens is you immediately call the PO or whoever’s on
the paper. I think it’s actually a reasonably collegial
relationship… So a kid absconds, leaves because he was
gambling or has a positive drug test or whatever, and
then we work with the courts to get him back. They
won’t remand him…. When it works right, it’s a
partnering.
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Often, “working right” depends upon the existence of
established relationships with criminal justice representatives, as some providers explained. An employee of a
large, multi-site treatment provider noted, “It sounds to
me like some of the requirements and rules are really infuriating but that where there are personal relationships
with the CJ folks, we’re able to work with them on a day
to day basis”.
Another provider also mentioned the importance of
established relationships, and his comments are worth
quoting at length:
I think we’re very good at the relationship building
and meeting the needs of whoever refers to us. That
doesn’t mean that we’ll ever compromise treatment
for a client if we feel that they need something that’s
different from what they court folks are asking for….
We’ll talk on the phone. It happens all the time where
a court person may say, these are the needs of this
person…and we may disagree. Chances are, we mostly
agree with their recommendations. We all want the
same good thing for the clients. But when there is a
point of tension, a point of disagreement, what we
have is a conversation and we try to work pretty
closely with them and more often than not we come
to a very strong agreement about how we need to go
forward…. That’s not to say that there isn’t tension…
That’s why we have the court liaison team because
sometimes the clinicians in the program don’t really
know the treatment court staff as well as our court
liaison staff…And what we do is we have them step in
the middle. Let’s say Brooklyn Treatment Court has a
question about how a client is being treated
(fictionalized example). Now whether or not it’s good
or bad, they may reach out to the program; in fact
they will reach out to the program. They may or may
not get the response that they’re looking for. In that
case, they’ll [the court will] reach out to us, the court
liaison team, and they’ll say, ‘Look is there any way
you and your staff can sort of step in and address this
issue for us?’ And we do that. We do that without
compromising the clinical integrity of treatment but
at the same time reminding the staff here that we do
have a relationship. It is important that these folks get
the progress reports on time and that there has to be
very strong communication with the court so that
they’re able to have their needs met as well.
Despite areas of disconnect between the treatment system and the criminal justice system, the relationship between the two systems, from the perspective of providers,
appears to have improved since the passage of the DLRA.
Providers report an increased understanding by criminal
justice actors of treatment issues, such as relapse, and
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stress the importance of establishing professional relationships between representatives of their organizations and
representatives of the criminal justice system.

Discussion
Our specific findings concern procedural matters related to
the passage and implementation of the DLRA, operational
issues concerned especially with defendant/client assessment and treatment, and relationship dynamics between
treatment providers and actors in the criminal justice system, including how these relationships may have changed
since the passage of the DLRA. By offering treatment providers’ views of these three areas, our research provides
some of the first information on how providers are experiencing the reforms in practice. These findings also enable
us to begin assessing how far the reforms have gone in
shifting NY drug policy from punishment to treatment.
Most notably, the absence of new administrative structures and procedures concerning contact and communication between the courts and the treatment system
should be considered a hindrance to shifting the way
NYC responds to drug-using offenders. Without a new
system that includes a greater role for treatment in the
courts from the beginning of the diversion process, NYC
has been left to rely on its existing systems. This seems
to have led to “business-as-usual” where the referral and
communication processes are concerned. It is likely that
from the courts’ perspective, this finding of business-asusual makes little sense. As noted above, the courts did
create a new judicial infrastructure in order to comply
with the DLRA, namely the Judicial Diversion Parts.
However, our findings indicate that drug treatment
providers receiving referrals from the courts have not
experienced much, if anything, in the way of change
from a procedural standpoint, especially where referral
and communication about the clinical aspects of the
cases are concerned.
This disconnect is likely related to what one advocacy
group has called the “limitations of court-directed implementation” of the DLRA (CCA 2009). In ceding control
of implementing the reforms to the judiciary, policymakers have (so far) missed an opportunity to generate
closer collaboration between treatment providers and
the courts and to signal to the courts that treatment has
a new role to play in the entire process henceforth. Collaboration between the two systems from the very beginning of implementation would have not only likely
changed the way the reforms were carried out but also
exemplified the type of cooperation that seems necessary
in a new paradigm focused on treatment rather than
punishment.
NYC has a relatively long history of providing treatment
as an alternative to incarceration and has historically made
greater use of ATIs than jurisdictions elsewhere in
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New York State. These alternatives include prosecutorcontrolled programs such as DTAP, drug courts, and sentences to probation that include a treatment mandate.
Throughout this history, judges, prosecutors, and casereferral and case-management agents have developed habits
of practice and expectations, not to mention entrenched interests, in some cases, in the status quo. The longstanding
use of diversion and the prominent role played by prosecutors in determining eligibility for drug court participation
perhaps explains providers' concerns that criminal justice
considerations continue to trump clinical ones in many
cases. A legislative reform alone is not enough to change
the practices of situated actors used to operating in established ways. Again, the importance of creating new structures and procedures in the implementation phase is
relevant.
Without a new infrastructure that includes some officially recognized role for treatment in the courts, what
seems to have occurred is that “people who were already
doing things a certain way just kept doing what they were
doing the same way”, as the expert quoted above noted. It
is possible to overstate the importance of this point, for
two main reasons. First, part of the tension between treatment and criminal justice is undoubtedly related to the
historical separation between the criminal justice system
and the treatment system, including areas where the aims
of the two systems may diverge. Second, “clients” or “patients” in treatment are also “defendants” under the jurisdiction of the criminal justice system and considered
criminal offenders throughout the treatment process.
Thus, even a new infrastructure including an officially recognized role for treatment in the courts would still be limited in its capacity to shift the power dynamics between
these two systems. However, there is growing awareness
that the development of fuller collaboration aimed at
bringing these two systems closer together and balancing
the power relationship would be beneficial to all involved,
serving both CJ and treatment interests.
The early signs of improved relationships between treatment providers and criminal justice representatives evident in our findings indicate that the reforms have already
generated some positive shift of NYC’s drug policy from
punishment to treatment. The comments of providers
we interviewed suggest that there may be two primary
avenues by which these relationships have improved.
First, those comments suggesting recent general improvement in relationships and greater understanding by criminal justice actors of issues such as relapse indicate a
possible “ideological rub-off” effect of the reforms. The
reforms’ explicit and highly publicized intent to move
from punishment to treatment may have influenced
individual criminal justice actors’ behavior, perhaps
warranting more lenient behavior by those already disposed in that direction and shifting the behavior of
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even some of those more inclined toward a punitive
paradigm.
The second, and probably more significant, avenue of
relationship improvement is clearly the enhanced use of
treatment-employed court liaison positions since the reforms. Interestingly, rather than bringing criminal justice
and treatment closer together, these positions are essentially an added layer or buffer between them. This point
brings up the important issue of the divergences in practice and aims between the criminal justice system and
the substance abuse treatment system. Even before the reforms, the court-employed case management and referral
agencies in NYC had constituted an intermediary system
between treatment and criminal justice; the treatmentemployed liaisons increasingly now stand as yet another.
What seems to be occurring in many cases is an intermediary communicating with an intermediary. Thus, in
this case, improved relationships may have resulted not
necessarily from increased understanding between the
two systems but rather from the addition of another
form of “lubricant” that has helped to decrease friction
between them.
Our study’s findings are limited in two key ways. First,
as we have discussed, our collection of cases is not a
probability sample, so the providers we interviewed cannot be considered representative of NYC or NYS providers. What this means is that we do not know how
these populations would be distributed across questions
derived from the categories we have identified in this
paper. We might observe interesting differences in particular between the NYC and NYS populations. As
noted, NYC has a robust history of providing treatment
as an alternative to incarceration. This means that the
city already had infrastructures in place for diverting clients from the criminal justice system to the treatment
system before the reforms. This is not necessarily the
case in jurisdictions outside the city, especially those in
the upstate area. In these areas, the newly created case
processing system for diverting clients under Article 216
of the DLRA may have had a more significant impact on
providers’ everyday practices. Upstate providers may not
be experiencing the type of process issues identified
from our case studies of NYC providers. Did upstate
providers have any voice in implementing the new judicial diversion processes in their jurisdictions? Do they
know and use the term “Article 216 cases” in their everyday practice? Has their communication and relationship
with the courts improved in the post-reform era? What
our paper has provided is valuable information with which
to generate questions such as these.
Our study’s second limitation is related to the first. Our
collection of cases is a non-probability “small sample” and
as such does not allow generalization. The size of a sample
needed for statistical generalizability depends, among other
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factors, on how pre-chosen variables are distributed,
whether a study aims to estimate a proportion or find a
causal relationship, and the total number of pre-selected
variables in the model. Hence, if statistical generalizability
were the key criterion of validity, then the type of indepth, open-ended, evolving qualitative interviews we
conducted in our study of cases could never be carried
out no matter how many people were interviewed. A future study that derives questions from the categories we
have identified would need to be conducted on a much
larger, random sample of providers in order to determine
generalizability to the population.
Our research contributes to knowledge of the drug law
reforms by presenting (for the first time) the voices of providers and their views of the evolving dynamics of treatment in the wake of the passage of the DLRA. These
providers have had extensive experience in treating criminal justice-mandated clients at established treatment organizations in NYC and did this work throughout the
period before the passage and implementation of the
DLRA. And despite its limitations, our research identifies
key issues of inquiry, delineates areas for further investigation, and offers specific data with which to generate hypotheses and stimulate further research.

Conclusion
In coming to conclusions regarding our research, it is
worthwhile to look back to 2009 when the reforms were
passed in order to reiterate that their explicit intent was
to shift New York’s drug policy from one focused on
punishment to one committed to treatment. As Senator
Ruth Hassell-Thompson noted at a press conference following the signing of the DLRA into law, “We are now
shifting resources to treat drug addiction as a medical
problem…. Study after study shows that our policies will
make our communities safer and save taxpayers millions
of dollars” (NYSGO 2009). Others echoed this same sentiment, as Governor Patterson’s comments on the day of
the DLRA’s passage indicate: “Today, we have succeeded.
With the stroke of a pen, the Rockefeller Drug Laws will
end…. But to be successful we must not only overhaul
the drug laws, we must also provide an infrastructure to
ensure that we successfully rehabilitate those who are
addicted with programs…[that exemplify] our approach
to focus on treatment, not punishment” (NYSGO 2009).
The overarching issue our study raises concerns the extent to which the reforms have effected the type of
changes many originally hoped they would.
Clearly, treatment as a response to drug enforcement
is increasingly supplanting punishment in NY under the
terms of the DLRA. Statewide administrative data show
that incarceration of drug offenders is down and screenings and admissions to drug courts are up since the reforms’ passage. For most providers, especially those that
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are publicly funded, contact with the criminal justice
system is ubiquitous and now a dominant reality of substance abuse treatment. While some elements of the relationship between these two systems have been in place
for years, the volume of mandated clients and the significance of the programs’ reliance on the criminal justice system for business represent a fundamental shift in
the dominant conditions of treatment and alter the ethical framework for treatment itself. In other words, shifting drug policy from punishment to treatment under the
DLRA has meant not only increased use of treatment as
an alternative to incarceration but also changes in the
practice of treatment itself.
It is now possible to see early signs of the emergence
of a new model in which treatment professionals and
programs accommodate to and collaborate closely with
the criminal justice system. On one hand, this new
model represents an increased willingness by criminal
justice actors to cede to the recommendations of treatment professionals. On the other, it indicates an increasing necessity for treatment professionals to subordinate
the traditional demands of treatment to the requirements of the powerful criminal justice system.
The passage of the DLRA has generated positive
changes in terms of shifting New York’s response to drug
offending, but implementation issues have narrowed the
degree of this shift. It is too early to tell whether the limited role of treatment providers in determining which defendants should be referred to treatment as an ATI, the
types of treatment that they receive, and/or appropriate
levels of criminal justice supervision will negatively impact
the number of people who successfully complete treatment compared to the number who ultimately enter custody following failure to meet the terms of their treatment
supervision. It is already clear that, under the terms of the
DLRA, we are seeing an evolving process in which a shift
from punishment to treatment is occurring alongside a
growing demand for treatment providers to meet the requirements of the criminal justice system.

Endnotes
a
The views expressed in this paper are solely the authors’
and do not reflect the views of either John Jay College or
the Vera Institute of Justice.
b
We discuss these issues in more depth in our methods
section.
c
The information provided about the sample and the
respondents’ organizations is deliberately vague in order
to protect their anonymity. It should also be noted that
providers spoke as individuals, not as representatives of
their organizations.
d
In 2009, Article 216 of the Penal Law went into effect
as part of the DLRA, giving judges, for the first time, the
power to divert clients into treatment without the
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consent of the prosecutor. The Unified Court System
created an entirely new case processing system and new
“Judicial Diversion Parts” in the courts to fulfill this part
of the legislative reforms. An Article 216 case refers to a
defendant/client diverted into treatment through this
newly created mechanism. (See the NYS 2009 Drug Law
Reform section on page 8 for more information).
e
TASC, or Treatment Alternatives for Safer Communities, is an outsourced referral and case-management
agency responsible for monitoring defendants/clients
diverted into treatment.
f
DTAP, or Drug Treatment Alternative to Prison, is a
prosecutor-run program located in 3 boroughs of NYC.
The programs began in Brooklyn in 1990 and expanded
to Manhattan and Queens in 1992.
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